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Abstract This paper investigates the multifaceted universe of Russian intelligentsia
and addresses the following, troubling, questions: What caused pro-democratic
political dissent to weaken among the intelligentsia in the aftermath of perestrojka?
Why has the young generation of Russian public intellectuals undergone a radical
metamorphosis of their value system and plunged into political passivity and con-
formism? Freedom has historically been a prima facie value for the Russian liberal
intelligentsia. By the mid-1990s, however, much of the intelligentsia came to be
associated not with advocacy of individual liberty and human rights but with the
failure of liberal democracy in Russia. This paper focuses on how the generation of the
1960s liberal intelligentsia, or shestidesjatniki, who played an active role during
perestrojka, gave way to a generation of the ‘‘sons,’’ who, characterized as Western-
style intellectuals, became spin doctors and political technologists, replacing the
original ideals and high moral stance of their predecessors with nihilistic nonchalance.
It is argued that the demise of dissent in post-Soviet Russia derives from the younger
generation of intellectuals’ view of the attainment of political power by the generation
of shestidesjatniki during perestrojka and the first El’tsin term as the latter’s moral fall
and abandonment of the intelligentsia’s traditional role as an outside critic of the state.
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‘‘There is always something suspect about an intellectual on the winning
side.’’
—Vaclav Havel, Czech writer and former Czech President
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‘‘We mean by the intelligentsia not, of course, the public that comes to the
balls and the Nobleman’s Assembly.’’
—Petr Struve, a philosopher and pre-revolutionary leader of Russian
liberalism
‘‘Freedom is one of the sorest subjects for the Russian intelligentsia.’’
— Iurii Lotman, the founder of structural semiotics in culturology
Introduction
This article rests on the disputable assumption that critical thinking conditions
intellectuals to opposition and dissent. It is because of their antagonistic streak that
intellectuals have been an inspirational force behind political resistance, including a
great many revolutionary uprisings (Shils 1969, p. 33). While some intellectuals are
conformist, such figures as Hannah Arendt, Vaclav Havel, Edward Said, and Noam
Chomsky exemplify Jean-Paul Sartre’s poignant definition of an intellectual as
‘‘someone who meddles in what does not concern him’’ (1965, p. 12). By
‘meddling’ in politics, public intellectuals often risk their careers, security, and even
their lives.1
Just as it has shaped experiences of Western public intellectuals, civic opposition
has also defined the Russian intelligentsia. Coterminous with the English term
‘‘public intellectuals’’ and the French intellectuels engage´s, the Russian intelligent-
sia comprises a social group of those individuals who play a crucial role as critics of
and a counterbalance to the state power (vlast’). The relationship between the
intelligentsia and vlast’ has always been crucial in Russian history, and peculiarities
of this relationship have been, and still are, a reaction of the intelligentsia to the
ambiguity and incomprehensibility of power and of its alienation from society. A
Silver Age symbolist poet, Maksimilian Voloshin, poignantly portrayed the Russian
intelligent as someone who is
Weak and persecuted, […]
A good soul, honest, spineless,
Imprinted, as a precise negative
Along the profile of the autocracy: a bump
In place of a fist, a hole in place of a bayonet,
A negation in place of an assertion,
Ideas, feelings—everything is to the contrary,
Everything is ‘through the prism of civic opposition.’2
The historical significance of the Russian intelligentsia has been defined by the
intelligentsia’s civic opposition. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn famously coined the
derogatory term ‘‘the smatterers’’ (obrazovantsy) to underline that one does not
become an intelligent through education only but through adherence to high moral
principles and a critical relation to authority (p. 125). The spirit of opposition, moral
1 Julien Benda cited in Kuzman (2002, p. 65).
2 The translation is mine.
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criticism of authority, and the belief that freedom is inextricably linked to the
establishment of a just social order have been, since the mid-19th century, the main
definitional characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia. This spirit drove the
Russian Decembrists’ 1825 rebellion at the Senate Square, a heroic act of self-
sacrifice for the sake of the common good. The same spirit inspired the 1860s
intelligentsia. The spirit of dissent resurfaced a century later, during Khrushchev’s
thaw in the ideas and practices of shestidesjatniki, the generation of liberal
intelligentsia of the 1960s. Two decades later, Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms
signaled the ‘‘second thaw’’ that ultimately melted the Soviet state’s authoritarian
structure and created an unprecedented window of opportunity for the intelligentsia
finally to assume a leading part in sociopolitical events and to become ‘‘heroes of a
new, individualist era’’ (Gasparov 1999, pp. 5–6). During this time, shestidesjatniki
became moral authorities, and certain dissidents, most notably the formerly
persecuted physicist Andrei’ Sakharov as well as the lawyer and champion of
human rights, Sergej Kovalev, acquired political prominence.
By the mid-1990s, however, much of the intelligentsia came to be associated not
with its traditional role as critics of government and defenders of freedom, human
rights, and the rule of law but with power, corruption, and the failure of liberal
democracy in Russia, as many intelligenty became servile to the state while others
plunged into political apathy. As the older generation of shestidesjatniki, the fathers,
were leaving the public scene, their sons, the younger generation of intellectuals,
abandoned liberal democratic beliefs. In doing so, they replaced advocacy for
individual liberty and rights with nationalism built upon state security, sovereignty,
and national interest, and engaged in the construction of discourses on ‘‘Fortress
Russia’’ (Iur’ev 2004) and ‘‘nostalgic retrospective conservatism.’’ (Kolesnikov
2004).
A number of theorists explain the demise of opposition and dissent as well as the
ideational shift within the ranks of the Russian intelligentsia by the universal
collapse of critical thinking and the triumph of political conformism that has been
most notably identified by such illustrious public intellectuals as Michel Foucault,
Herbert Marcuse, and Noam Chomsky, among others.3 The social havoc,
disintegration of the state, and overall spiritual and ideological crisis that
overshadowed Russia during the Boris El’tsin years has also undoubtedly
contributed to the downfall of intellectualism in Russia where, since the mid-
1990s, the disillusionment with liberal democracy—a concept which was to be the
panacea for Russia’s societal ailments—has supplanted initial enthusiasm. I do not
presume to refute the validity of these arguments; rather, my attempt is to
supplement these explanations with a more nuanced dimension based on genera-
tional dynamics during the 20 years since the inception of perestrojka. I argue that
the transmutation of post-Soviet political dissent in Russia into passive compliance
with the decisions taken by the government stem from the younger intellectuals’
negative perception of the shestidesjatniki’s role during perestrojka and the first
El’tsin term. As dissidents among shestidesjatniki acquired political leverage and
moved to the other side of the line that traditionally separated the intelligentsia from
3 On the waning role of intellectuals in the public sphere, see Furedi (2004).
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the state, the younger generation of intellectuals saw this ‘‘going to the state’’
(khozhdenie vo vlast’) as an indication of the shestidesjatniki’s corruption by power.
This move delegitimized the intelligentsia and dealt a final blow to the concept of
the intelligentsia as a dissenting critic of the regime. I start by briefly revisiting the
generation of shestidesjatniki. I then examine the role of shestidesjatniki,
particularly of dissidents among them, during perestrojka. I finally elucidate the
paradigm shift from liberal democracy to conservatism and from dissent to consent
among the younger generation of intellectuals in the aftermath of perestrojka.
Shestidesjatniki revisited: a glorious generation
Perhaps the only well-defined Soviet generation, shestidesjatniki defy clear
definition. According to Andrei’ Nemzer, ‘‘Nobody could really tell who they
are; the word was becoming a symbol, a swearword, a compliment—anything but a
term.’’4 In my understanding of shestidesiatnichestvo, I follow the Mannheimian
tradition of conceptualizing a generation not in a biological but a sociological sense
as an ‘‘agent of social change’’ that unites people who share similar values and
behavioral patterns (Mannheim [1927] 1952; Laufer and Bengston 1974; Voronkov
2005). Thus, while most shestidesjatniki were the segment of pro-Western
intelligentsia whose youth coincided with Khrushchev’s Thaw, the group is
primarily defined not by age but by their belief system. The generation of the 1960s
is often compared to the Decembrists and to the generation of the 1860s in that they
all resisted lies and violence and engaged in peaceful civic protest while fearlessly
upholding their beliefs and not bowing to a repressive regime. The shestidesjatniki
of the 1960s combined their admiration of the West with devotion to communism.
They were supportive of Khrushchev’s reforms but called for more radical changes,
some of them in direct confrontation with the state. In this sense, they were non-
conformists who hoped that the monopoly of the Communist Party would one day
end.
Soviet dissent arose out of the spirit of shestidesiatnichestvo. The children of the
thaw, shestidesjatniki embodied the dissident movement initiated following the 20th
Congress of the Communist Party (1956) and in response to the suppression of
Hungarian and Polish uprisings during the same year. The history of the Soviet
dissident movement began with arrests in 1957 of groups of oppositionist members
of the intelligentsia. The movement continued until the late 1970s-early 1980s when
it was violently suppressed, its members persecuted and placed in mental
institutions, and others forced into exile. Thus, while shestidesiatnichestvo ended
with the Prague Spring in 1968, we may speak of the 30 years of political protest
(1956–1985) prior to perestrojka as one continuous period.
Intelligentsia’s gilded age: Shestidesjatniki during perestrojka
During perestrojka, in their steadfast support of democratization, the intelligentsia
was stimulated by the slogans of ‘‘freedom,’’ ‘‘social justice,’’ and the ‘‘rule of law.’’
4 Andrei Nemzer cited in Voronkov (2005, p. 173).
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These principles were already articulated by the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia but
became catchwords during the 1960s. The ideational roots of the Gorbachev-era
reforms are embedded in the spirit of shestidesiatnichestvo and in the 30 years of
Soviet dissident movement including human rights activism which, by the
beginning of perestrojka, had reached its peak and waned. But this fiasco of
underground dissent only inspired further radicalization and politicization of the
younger generation of intellectuals who called for extreme societal transformation.5
Thus, according to Tatiana Zaslavskaia, it was not just shestidesjatniki who
supported perestrojka but also the younger generation who were in their 20s and
30s.6 Thus, sons and fathers alike united under the banner of perestrojka as, ‘‘living
beneath unthinkable tyrannical pressure, the intelligentsia built up within itself a
colossal charge of negative energy[,] …an unbridled thirst for a universal
restructuring.’’7
It was democracy understood as respect for individual liberties, freedom of press,
and the rule of law that the intelligentsia called for during perestrojka. Differing
from the dissident calls for transformation, official perestrojka nevertheless opened
the gates for the critical intelligentsia to eventually take the driver’s seat in politics.
Many shestidesjatniki, some of them former dissidents, played an active role during
perestrojka. In 1986 Gorbachev welcomed the return of Andrei Sakharov from
Gorky, where this renowned scientist spent time in exile. Sakharov’s release
denoted Gorbachev’s desire to establish cooperation with the intelligentsia and the
educated e´lites and demarcated the beginning of the intelligentsia’s political
awakening (Garcelon 1997, p. 51). In 1987, during the Plenary Party Session,
articles 70 (anti-Soviet agitation) and 190 (collaboration with anti-Soviet agitation)
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic were
amended. A subsequent amnesty led to the rehabilitation of other political prisoners;
upon their return, many of them, including Sakharov, joined the democratic
movement.
In 1988 the Democratic Union was formed as the first political opposition proto-
party. In its founding declaration the DemSoyuz leaders postulated that ‘‘uniting us all
is an adherence to the ideals of democracy, which for us is not a slogan, but the form
and the meaning of a state system based on political, economic, and moral pluralism,
on a multi-party system, legal opposition, a free press, and independent trade unions.’’8
In its outright criticism of the socialist system and official perestrojka’s stance of the
return to true Leninism, the DemSoyuz called the Soviet Union a totalitarian state. Its
members pushed for national self-determination for the republics and the withdrawal
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In opposition to all forms of totalitarianism, these
intellectuals wanted to construct a ‘‘liberal model of capitalism’’ in Russia, which
would be based on individualism and private property.9
5 Kagarlitky cited in Petro (1991, p. 111).
6 See Zaslavskaia (1988).
7 Vladimir Pastukhov, cited in Kagarlitsky (2002, p. 51).
8 The Democratic Union Program, Archive of the Democratic Union, 1989, [http://www.ds.ru/
oldprog.htm].
9 Declaration of the Democratic Union of Russia, December 19, 1993, [ http://www.ds.ru/ust.htm].
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The intelligentsia found its main political tribune in the Congress of People’s
Deputies.10 The Congress met twice a year in order to pass legislation and to advise
the government. Its meetings were televised, which allowed the country to follow
debates, thus creating unprecedented pluralistic opportunities for expressing
dissenting opinions and criticizing the official Communist Party line (Fish 1995,
p. 35). It was through the Congress that the intelligentsia began to acquire political
power and gained an opportunity to work at weakening the regime from within.
Many prominent intellectuals became deputies, among them theater directors Oleg
Efremov and Mark Zakharov, the writers Viktor Astaf’ev, Valentin Rasputin,
Vassil’ Bykov, and the editor of Novyi Mir, Sergei Zalygin, and the physicists
Andrej Sakharov and Roal’d Sagdeev. Pavel Bunich, Nikolaj Shmelev, Dmitrij
Likhachev, Chingiz Ajtmatov, Evgenij Evtushenko, Fedor Burlatskij, Tatjana
Zaslavskaja, Jurij Karjakin, and many others were also members. The intelligentsia
thus came into direct contact with political decision makers and some became
decision makers in their own right. When it became clear that the Communists still
outnumbered the democratic forces within the Congress, 250 pro-democratic
deputies united in a revolutionary fraction of the ‘‘Interregional Deputies Group,’’
with Boris El’tsin, Jurij Afanas’ev, Gavriil Popov, and Estonian Academician
Victor Palm as its Chairs. The pact between El’tsin, a representative of the party
nomenklatura, and the liberal intelligentsia was concluded in the Moskovskii Klub
Intelligentsii and the Moskovskoe Ob’edinenie Izbiratelei (MOI). This conglomer-
ation called for the abandonment of socialism, further market reforms, and the
Russian Federation’s (RF) sovereignty from the USSR.
In March 1990, Article 6 (the leading role of the Communist Party) was removed
from the Constitution, and it was now possible to organize political parties that
would challenge the Communists. The founding in 1990 of the DemRossia
(Democratic Russia Movement) became the watershed event that led to the
cementing of perestrojka from above and the metamorphosis of the intelligentsia
into a new political power. Under its umbrella this proto-party united informal
groups, associations, and unions, as well as reform-oriented individuals from the
Communist Party. The Party nominated El’tsin for President of the RF in 1991 and
coordinated his campaign. While DemRossia was fractured by internal conflict, at
the same time, it was the most significant pro-democratic coalition of the early
1990s in Russia.
Whereas during the ‘‘first act’’ of perestrojka (1985–1989) Gorbachev relied on
the intelligentsia’s support in his battle with conservatives within the Communist
Party, the Soviet leader changed his strategy as the situation began to spin out of his
control. Thus, by 1989 he firmly decided to curb the increasingly activist democratic
opposition led by the intelligentsia, initiating a new phase of reaction during
perestrojka’s ‘‘second act’’ (1989–1991). However, far from putting an end to the
intelligentsia’s radical aspirations, this policy only propelled its members towards
adopting ever more extreme objectives. The radicalization of the democratic
movement during the last years of perestrojka led to the unification of formerly
10 The first contested election in many years to the Congress of People’s Deputies was an event of a truly
historical significance. See Sheinis (2003, pp. 31–44).
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divergent groups and to an open confrontation thereof with the Communist
establishment, a confrontation that escalated towards a revolution in August 1991.
The dramatic events of the Fall of 1991 ended in a defeat of the state and the
Communist Party and the election of the intelligentsia’s prote´ge´, El’ltsin, as the first
president of the RF. The liberal intelligentsia’s crusade against its Communist
nemesis ended in the de-legitimization of the Communist Party and the introduction
of full-scale liberalization reforms.
Perestrojka thus ended with a true victory of the pro-democratic intelligentsia.
While Gorbachev never envisioned bringing about a complete abrogation of
Communism and never ventured further than a return to Leninist principles, the
intelligentsia delegitimized not only Stalinism but the very core of the Soviet
ideology embedded in Leninist thought, and united in support of pro-Western
liberalism. It sufficed for the state to half-open the valve for the former dissidents to
push further, and, in the person of El’sin, to join forces finally with the state. Thus,
from principled non-acceptance of the regime the former dissidents turned to
collaboration with it. The intelligentsia descended from its high moral horse and
entered cold politics.
Krizis zhanra: the intelligentsia’s support for El’tsin
The events of the 1991 putsch led to the integration of former dissidents into the
system, as those who fought on the barricades (some of them literally) joined
El’tsin’s government as ministers and advisers, thereby no longer representing a
resistance force but, rather, the political e´lite. El’tsin surrounded himself by young
liberal economists such as Egor Gajdar, Anatolij Chubajs, and Grigorij Javlinskij,
while many former dissidents found a niche within the radius of the political sun and
became celebrity figures, such as Sergej Kovalev, a pravozashchitnik (human rights
activist) who assumed a position as Ombudsman of Human Rights.
While the 1991 revolution marked the highest point of the intelligentsia’s
romance with the state, the revolution of 1993 marked the solidification of the
affair’s end. The 1993 smuta (time of troubles) was characterized by the crisis of
semi-presidentialism and a diarchy between the Kremlin and the parliament.11
Although the intelligentsia stood by El’tsin in both cases, the wholehearted support
of 1991 gave way, by 1993, to a backing mired in suspicion and distrust. During
these years, the intelligentsia found itself in an ambiguous position as collaboration
with the state entailed standing by the undemocratic measures to which the
government resorted in order to avert anarchy and to expedite the coming of the
bright new capitalist future. Within the span of these few years, the intelligentsia’s
elation was replaced by a sense of betrayal: immediately following the defeat of the
State Committee on National Emergency (GKChP) in August 1991 El’tsin
demonstrated his repressive streak by first banning the Communist Party, closing
a number of pro-Communist publications, and transferring ownership of the Party’s
11 For an excellent analysis of this crisis, see Huskey (2001).
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buildings to privileged democrats.12 Moreover, the first Russian president secured
the upper hand over the Supreme Soviet, disregarded the Constitution, and used his
powers to initiate, in the winter of 1992, market-oriented reforms by Presidential
decree. The parliament was dissolved in September 1993, and a new ‘‘unconsti-
tutional’’ Constitution, which many critical intellectuals believed to be a far cry
from what they had hoped to achieve for their country, was introduced. Thus, far
from living up to the intelligentsia’s aspirations, El’tsin proved to be an
authoritarian leader dressed in democratic clothes.
Despite certain signs of doubt, the intelligentsia still united behind El’tsin during
the White House insurgency in October 1993 and the adoption of the new
Constitution. In an attempt at self justification, Afanas’ev wrote that ‘‘[t]he battle
was not between ‘good’ and ‘very good’, but between ‘bad’ and ‘very bad’’
(Afanas’ev 2005, p. 49). Like many fellow reformers, the historian felt conster-
nation when the Kremlin used force against the insurgents at the White House; he
accused El’tsin’s ideologues of mobilizing public opinion, and criticized the
intelligentsia for believing that there was no other way but to curtail this rebellion
forcefully. In his article entitled ‘‘Bloody October’’ Gavriil Popov characterized
these events as follows: ‘‘In Russia temples were built on blood: for the sake of
eternal memory and in order to endure. The new Constitution of Russia was
likewise written with the people’s blood. This blood was not for nothing: the people
got nothing, but out of this blood a modern Russian democracy was born.’’13
If the dissolution of Parliament in October 1993 and the new Constitution were
the first red lights that sealed the period of hope for the creation of an open
democratic society, the beginning of the first Chechen War in December 1994 was
the final blow to the intelligentsia’s belief that it had leverage on the government:
while some intellectuals were critical of the war, it, nevertheless, continued.
Kovalev, the Human Rights Commissioner, was one of the few intellectuals actively
engaged in advocacy against the war as he documented the atrocities of the Russian
army and human rights violations from Grozny. Such former Soviet dissidents as
Aleksandr Lavut, Arsenii Roginskii, Aleksandr Podrabinek, Sakharov’s wife Elena
Bonner, as well as Memorial activists, supported Kovalev’s cause (Horvath 2005,
pp. 138–149). However, their efforts to put an end to the campaign were futile as
liberal journalist Masha Gessen has noted (Gessen 1997). Kovalev and his
supporters were too few to bring forward a change, as their voices drowned in the
overall silence that descended upon the fragmented ranks of disenchanted
intelligentsia.
While initially opposed to the war, the majority of the intelligentsia came to view
the Russian campaign in Chechnya not unlike it was officially portrayed by El’tsin’s
government: a ‘‘restoration of the constitutional order’’ and the rightful fight against
organized crime. Chechens were seen not as freedom fighters but bandits and
12 Buildings belonging to the CPSU became property of the new democratic government. For example,
the buildings of the Vysshaia Partiinaia Shkola were given to the Russian State University for the
Humanities where one of the reformers, Iurii Afanas’ev, was the dean, and a palace of the Vysshaia
Partiinaya Shkola was given to the International University of Gavriil Popov, another radical democrat.
13 Popov (2003). The article appeared in commemoration of a 10-year anniversary of the shelling of the
White House.
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Muslim fundamentalists represented a security threat for Russia. This situation was
further helped by the Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev himself, as he often referred
to the ‘Islamic threat’ in order to prevent a Russian attack in 1994 (Lieven 1999, p.
364). Needless to say, Dudaev played on the Russian fear of Muslim fundamen-
talism by hinting that certain Islamic states are interested in the fate of their Muslim
brethren in Chechnya and that foreign combatants were coming to the region in
order to participate in a holy war against Russian infidels (German 2003). The First
Chechen War thus further fueled Russian patriotism and hammered the last nail in
the coffin of human rights activism. Kovalev’s stance on Chechnya cost him his
position as an Ombudsman of Human Righs as he, along with like-minded members
of the intelligentsia, was accused of anti-Russian propaganda and lack of patriotism.
The destabilizing upheavals that followed perestrojka such as the dissolution of
the USSR, nationalist strife, economic hardship, the rise of crime and the de-valuing
of human life, led the intelligentsia to renounce their support for reform while
muting their reaction to the first Chechen War. As many former liberals joined the
conservative camp, human rights, as a concept, lost its appeal in the eyes of the
intelligentsia in favor of the principles of state security, sovereignty, and the
inviolability of state borders.
The intelligentsia adapted its usual state of mind—that of self-denunciation, as it
felt powerless to bring an end to the conflict. During the 1996 election, for lack of a
better alternative the liberal intelligentsia grudgingly supported El’tsin’s nomination
for a second term. The intelligentsia’s frustration at that time was depicted by Sergej
Zalygin: ‘‘I do not know whether to elect Sergej Kovalev as president, or appeal to
the intelligentsia to go to the people, or to engage in farming, teaching, or to become
a lathe operator, or to study the Bible, or to reason according to Chekhov’’ (Zalygin
1995).
Perestrojka and the first half of the 1990s demonstrated that, like a moth coming
too close to light, the intelligentsia was blinded by too direct an exposure to power.
The period of the intelligentsia’s active political involvement did not last for long,
and many of its most illustrious members were affected to the core, became
disillusioned or morally corrupted. A resolute democrat, El’dar Rjazanov,
proclaimed with disgust: ‘‘It is too bad that the [Communist Party of the Soviet
Union] was taken away from our democrats. They immediately turned into
marauders’’ (Rjazanov 1992). Sergej Stankevich, for instance, was accused of
money laundering and emigrated to France. Gavriil Popov became an authoritarian
Moscow Mayor. Professor Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet of the RF, embodied the corruption of the intelligentsia by moving into
Leonid Brezhnev’s former apartment on prestigious Kutuzovskij Prospect. Having
lost their high ethical stance, these members of the political e´lite were no longer
perceived to be the intelligentsia, and the definition of the group itself became the
subject of intense self-scrutiny.
Far from bolstering the intelligentsia’s new power status, this experience of
khozhdenie vo vlast’ led to the intelligentsia’s identity crisis, and the initial
jubilation was supplanted by lingering apprehension. The period of 1991–1995 can
be considered the ‘‘intelligentovedcheskoe pyatilietie’’ (5 years of most intense
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study of the intelligentsia): some 15 conferences on the subject of the group’s role in
society and its relation with the state took place around the country.14 A wave of
articles critical of the liberal intelligentsia appeared, ranging from criticism by
communists and patriots to self-condemnation by members of the democratic
intelligentsia itself.15 Among these ‘‘sorrows of the old intelligentsia’’ were
proclamations of the intelligentsia’s death and of intelligenty’s reincarnation as
western-type intellectuals (Gudkov 1992). The verdict that the intelligentsia was
now non-existent appeared on the pages of the major journal, Znamja, as if to end
the two centuries of popularity of ‘‘thick journals.’’ Shestidesiatnik Granin thus
summed up the sorry state of the intelligentsia in the new post-perestrojka world:
These stormy processes in the country are changing the destiny of the Russian
intelligentsia. In this new, pragmatic, rational world, less and less space
remains for the previous spiritual communion, with all the charm of the heated
interest in the new books, the theater premiers, the exhibits. We lived for art.
The ‘‘thick’’ literary journals had hundreds of thousands of subscribers. The
monthly journals, Novyj mir and Znamja, each had circulations of more than a
million copies. Today their circulations are down to under fifty thousand, but
not only because the price has gone up. People just do not have time to read.
And they do not feel like reading. The intelligentsia is finding a different base.
People are going into business. The dissident movement has run out of steam.
The intellectual opposition today has no program. … The old Russian
intelligentsia is disappearing and may grow extinct’’ (Granin 1995, p. 75).
As throughout Russian history, when the country found itself at a crossroads, the
intelligentsia was expected during the 1990s to show the way and to say the ‘‘last
word.’’ When proved unable to produce miracles, the intelligentsia felt subject to
disapproving scrutiny by both internal and external critics. Each phase of Russian
history concluded with the evaluation of the intelligentsia’s actions by the
intelligentsia itself in works including Vekhi, Iz glubiny, and Iz-pod glyb. During the
1990s, many self-flagellating accounts by members of the intelligentsia made
reference to the authors of Vekhi.
With the liberal intelligentsia’s help, socialism was completely discredited during
perestrojka, and equality and egalitarianism came to be associated with the failed
experience of uravnilovka (levelling). This attitude is evident in the emotional reply
of Ales’ Adamovic, a writer and one of the maıˆtres of perestrojka to Western
intellectuals of the left:
‘‘[F]ight for the cause yourself, that will be plenty! Trying to talk us into
continuing the building of communism, socialism with a ‘human face’, is the
same as trying to convince the residents of Chernobyl that ‘clean’ and ‘safe’
nuclear power is possible’’ (Adamovic 1995, p. 102).
14 See Memetov (1996).
15 For but a few out of a multitude of articles that resulted from these sorrows of the intelligentsia see, for
instance, Tret’iakov (1997); Nikolaeva (1997); Granin (1997).
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At the same time, while there was no way back to the socialist past, the capitalist
future and the prospects of successful liberalization seemed gloomier. Neo-
liberalism a` la russe dealt a serious blow to the majority of the intelligentsia as, in
Boris Kagarlitsky’s words, ‘‘[t]here was no place in the conception of the neo-liberal
economy for an intelligentsia of the Russian type’’ (Kagarlitsky 2002, p. 52).
Contrary to some enthusiastic accounts, the majority of the intelligentsia did not
miraculously metamorphose into a middle class: 44% of the intelligentsia found
themselves below the poverty level and 7% below the level of extreme poverty
(Sabov 2001, p. 5). Many intelligenty failed to adapt to the market economy, and
more and more became nostalgic for the Soviet era. Partially in light of this
economic hardship, the intelligentsia no longer had time for thinking about social
justice and the fate of the people as it became engaged in ‘‘a battle of survival on a
biological level’’ (Smolina 2000, p. 146). For those members of the intelligentsia
who became involved in politics, ‘‘[t]he place of sincere sympathy for the
authorities … was quickly taken by material dependence on them’’ (p. 120).
Constant preoccupation with byt (everyday drudgery), and the lack of money
undoubtedly contributed to a spiritual crisis of the intelligentsia. While many
continued their intellectual occupations and plunged into poverty, others went into
business.16 Still many others emigrated creating a massive brain drain and
provoking criticism from those who stayed behind.
As a result of this new climate, the whole value system of even those intellectuals
who succeeded to adapt to the laws of the market had changed. It is no longer
considered praiseworthy to be a gadfly and a critic of an almighty regime that spits
into the wind. While the old-style intelligenty, even the well-to-do among them,
were above meshchanstvo (philistinism) and materialism, the new well-off Russian
intellectuals evoke bobos, the bohemian-bourgeoisie in the West, as they evaluate
their worth and status in material terms and in new cars, luxury apartments, and
shopping trips abroad.
On the ideational plane, the divide between liberalism and the Red-Brown
coalition of communists and patriots was bridged during the El’tsin era to give birth
to eclectic proto-ideologies. In 1993, the prominent historian Aleksandr Akhiezer
advocated a conservative, or pochvennyi (grass-roots), liberalism (1993, pp. 12–21).
Many other intellectuals called for a ‘‘conservative turn’’ to traditional values. Thus,
Sousanna Matveeva deemed ‘‘classical’’ liberalism to be an impossibility in Russia
with its particular history and culture. Similarly to Akhiezer, Matveeva saw the
value of conservative liberalism in that ‘‘it tries to work out a liberal paradigm and
its basic ideas and principles based on grassroots material’’ (1993, pp. 5–10).
Matveeva proclaimed conservative liberalism ‘‘a real and a growing tendency that
has cultural and social roots’’ (p. 13). In 1995 Inoe, a watershed four-volume
anthology of sharp criticism of liberalism, was published. This volume later served
as a foundation for the creation of the pro-nationalistic Russkij zhurnal. Inoe
presented an alternative to the ideas of the perestrojka era as it questioned the
16 Many scientists went into business and utilized their know-how in the private sector. Thus, once
unpromising biologist Mikhail Iur’ev abandoned genetics to become an entrepreneur and one of the
richest men in Russia. Iur’ev is the author of a notorious article ‘‘Fortress Russia’’ where he advocates
complete isolationism (autarchy) of Russia and warring anti-westernism. Iur’ev ([2004] 2005).
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developments of the past decade and proposed original ways out of the imbroglio.
While the volume united under its cover an unexpected array of authors with
opposing views, ranging from pro-western to nationalist,17 the compilation signified
the end of the intelligentsia’s support for liberalism.
As the events of the roaring 1990s unraveled, the intelligentsia eventually lost its
fleeting political leverage, and some of its members remained servants of an
increasingly autocratic regime while others became indifferent to politics altogether
by the end of the decade. Although the more honest among the intelligentsia retired
from the political stage, others continued their collaboration with the regime, thus
giving up their group identity and making the concept of the intelligentsia more
nebulous than ever.
Intelligentsia and pustota
Before turning to the Putin era, I shall first take a literary detour into the work of
Viktor Erofeev and Viktor Pelevin. Erofeev has captured the essence of the
relationship between the intelligentsia and the state under Putin:
‘‘I … dreamed of Putin. I asked him why the Russian intelligentsia
disappeared from the television screens. …It pained him that the Russian
intelligentsia had disappeared. …Putin is a tsar of the Russian dream. This is
the main reason for his success. He exists for Russians on the level of the
subconscious. He promises to each what each needs the most. …he…was
playing the Void (pustota) that each of us could fill with one’s feelings. The
Void of Putin does not believe in the efficacy of words and slogans. It does not
tolerate any resistance. It is an all-consuming, self-sufficient hole’’ (2004).
The author of the famous Chapaev and Pustota (Chapaev and the Void), Pelevin
(2003) made a peculiar allusion to the novel Melkii bes (Petty Demon) by the
Symbolist author Fedor Sologub. The main character in Sologub’s work is driven to
madness and is haunted by an omnipresent petty demon, who exists only in his
imagination. In one of his interviews, Pelevin made a reference to the Sologubian
imaginary character:
‘‘In Russia, nothing ever changes. Something else happens—the same guest
constantly comes to our house, a petty demon, who dresses as a commissar,
then as a traveling salesman, then as a bandit, then as an FSB agent. The main
goal of this petty demon is to trick you, to make you believe that everything
changed, when in fact it is only his dress that has changed’’ (2003).
One does not need much imagination to guess who Pelevin alluded to as Russia’s
current melkii bes. State power has always represented in Russia the omnipresent
Void. And yet, something has changed. During the Soviet times power worked
through language as the population, in Stephen Kotkin’s terms, identified with the
17 Contributing authors to Inoe were Sergei Kurginian, Andrei Fadin, Vadim Tsymburskii, Mikhail
Gefter, Teodor Shanin, Aleksandr Panarin, Simon Kordonskii, Vladimir Makhnach, and Petr Shedro-
vitskii. See Sergei Chernyshev, ed., Inoe, Moskva, 1995.
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regime through ‘‘speaking Bolshevik’’ (Kotkin 1995, pp. 198–237, pp. 488–515).
Like the rest of the population, the intelligentsia engaged in doublespeak through
which they succeeded in their careers and, during Stalinism, survived. What is more,
the intelligentsia leaped from official Soviet discourse, which they engaged in as
constructors of Soviet social reality, to unofficial—dissident—kitchen talk in which
they fulfilled the group’s task as a critic of that very society which they helped to
construct. With Putin’s ascendance to power, the official and unofficial discourses
have come to represent one and the same as today’s intellectual no longer
differentiates between official and unofficial discourses. Free from an internal
conflict, today’s intellectual happily works for Gazprom and ‘‘speaks Gazprom.’’
The figure of Putin is central to understanding the most recent period in the
history of the Russian intelligentsia. In 2000, journalist Leonid Poliakov wrote an
article under the title ‘‘Liberal’nyj konservator’’ (‘‘Liberal Conservative’’) where he
accurately noted the enigmatic and unpredictable nature of the Kremlin’s ruler and
compared him to a ‘‘white sheet of paper’’ and a ‘‘black box’’ (p. 20). On the one
hand, upon his accession to power, Putin proclaimed that he is against the
restoration of any official ideology as ‘‘in democratic Russia there should be no
coercive public consensus.’’18 On the other, he reopened the El’tsin-era debate about
the new national idea. By implicitly re-instating ideology as an important
component of politics, Putin thus initiated an auction for new ideas and the coming
of a new epoch for the post-Soviet intelligentsia and for Russia. This auction is,
however, not a marketplace, as the process is controlled by the state thus stamping
out free debate. In other words, Putin’s regime collects from intellectuals a grab bag
of concepts which are then molded into an eclectic new ideology according to the
regime’s needs.
During Putin’s first term, patriotism and liberalism solidified into a new
ideational trend propagated by the state leader himself and imitated by a majority of
public intellectuals. Liberal conservatism transfused into a discourse on ‘‘sovereign
democracy,’’ the term coined by one of the chief state ideologues, Vladislav
Surkov.19 Based on the premise that Russia is pursuing its own distinct path of
development under the guidance of the supreme power of the state, the concept of
sovereign democracy is being molded into a solid edifice of semi-official state
ideology.
In his widely read Generation P on the life of copywriters in the advertisement
industry, Pelevin implicitly accounts for the transformation of the intelligentsia into
polittekhnologi. In a conversation between two copy writers, one sighs that:
‘‘You know, you and I are ideological workers, if you haven’t realized it yet.
Propagandists and agitators. For that matter, I used to work in ideology before,
too, on the level of the Komsomol Central Committee. All the others are
bankers now, I’m the only one left…So I tell you, I didn’t need any
reconstructing. Before I believed that ‘the individual is nothing, the collective
is everything.’ Now I believe that ‘the image is nothing, the craving is
18 Vladimir Putin, 1999 policy manifesto ‘‘Russia at the Turn of the Millenium,’’ January 1, 2000, [http://
www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru].
19 Surkov (2006).
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everything.’ Agitation and propaganda will never die. The only thing that
changes is the words’’ (1999, p. 139).
Under Putin’s regime, the intelligentsia have become a mouthpiece of liberal
conservatism and sovereign democracy. For a prominent intellectual, Aleksandr
Neklessa, this intelligentsia no longer exists and has given way to ljudi vozdukha
(people of air), or the new intellectual class that ‘‘now creates not novels nor poetry,
but high geostrategic and economic technologies’’ (2005). As if a character in
Pelevin’s novel, Putin’s ideological right hand and a former dissident, Gleb
Pavlovskij avers that his goal is to produce ‘‘a symbolic image of a reality that
needed to exist, but which in the short term could not be realized in practice.’’20 The
new intellectuals cater to the needs of the current regime and blend with other social
groups in entrusting in Putin their hopes for the end of chaos of the previous decade.
The majority of intellectuals in today’s Russia perceive Putin to be the savior
from the chaos of the El’tsin years and an antidote to the anarchy of the 1990s.
Many intellectuals would subscribe to Roy Medvedev’s (2004) praise for Putin’s
qualities in the historian’s biography of the Russian leader: ‘‘…it is precisely such a
leader that was needed in our times, needed by the course of events, by the people of
Russia’’ (p. 8). Since the early 1990s, authors including such early proponents of
soft authoritarianism as Andranik Migranjan, Vitalij Najshul, Sergej Kurginjan, and
Aleksandr Panarin, as well as other contributors to Inoe, personified the resurrection
of a conservative wing within liberalism.21 Some of these intellectual figures who
were active during the El’tsin era formed the bulwark of the conservative drift
during Putin’s administration (Mezhuev 2004). A former liberal and now a staunch
conservative, Mikhail Leont’ev (2005), recalls a ‘‘natural’’ transformation of his
own and his generation’s belief system: ‘‘The circle of people that I belonged to
perceived the events of the beginning of the 1990s as a triumph of liberalism. I am
ashamed of this.…The Russian Soviet intelligentsia did the same thing in 1991 that
it did in 1917’’ (pp. 67–68).
Contemporary public intellectuals support not the defense of human rights and
individual liberties, but Russia’s acquisition of great power status, its economic
stabilization and the cementing of the transition achieved during the El’tsin era. The
national interest has become of chief importance to many public intellectuals,
whereby other values wane in comparison to Russia’s desire to become a strong
state and occupy its rightful place in world politics. No longer interested in the
promotion of universal values of human rights and social justice, the intelligentsia
emphasizes Russia’s samobytnost’ (particularity). Public intellectuals consider it
absurd to care about such abstract categories as human rights and justice amidst the
violence, corruption, and paucity of life that surrounds them, and when a large
component of the intelligentsia itself is impoverished and humiliated by the loss of
its social status during the 1990s. Increasingly adhering to an essentialistic,
deterministic notion of culture as a static, ‘‘organic’’ given, many intellectuals breed
20 Pavlovskii cited in Kagarlitsky (2002, pp. 126–128).
21 During the early stages of perestrojka, Migranjan already advocated a ‘‘strong hand’’ theory and ‘‘a
more dictatorial approach to democracy’’ and even coined the term ‘‘demokratura’’. See Migranjan,
Kliamkin (1990); Najshul’ (1992).
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cultural particularism and refute the notion of the universal ‘‘end of history’’ by
presenting Russian and Western ‘‘civilizations’’ as mutually impermeable entities,
each following its own path of development. Reduced to this essentialistic cultural
core, these intellectuals argue that civilizations do not choose their path of
development, as their destiny is predetermined. In these civilizationist and
culturalist accounts history gives way to Ersatz-history, a counterfeit constructed
with the help of old stereotypes and new myths based on the binary opposition of
Russian and Western ‘‘civilizations,’’ each endowed with a set of traditions and non-
malleable values determined by unalterable cultural codes. These culturally
relativistic accounts draw an impermeable mental border between Western and
Russian ‘‘civilizations,’’ whereby the West assumes once again the role of the Other
against which Russian ‘‘differentness’’ is highlighted and Russian national identity
is constructed and measured.
The transformation of many former pro-Western liberals among intellectuals into
conservatives, and of dissenters into passive by-standers is linked to the perception
of the failures of the fathers, the generation of intellectuals active during
perestrojka. The morally spent force of Russia’s young democracy was correlated
in the eyes of many with the ethical failure of the conscience of the nation
exemplified by shestidesjatniki’s role during perestrojka and the first El’tsin years.
No longer knights of liberalization on white horses shestidesjatniki are viewed by
the younger generations as Don Quixotes of a lost cause. While some shestidesjat-
niki survived until the Putin era, and some of them even continue their intellectual
and political activity today, the vast majority has found itself outside current
political games. Shestidesjatniki’s experience of democratic opposition is at best
ignored, at worst serves as a reason to blame these intellectuals for the disastrous
consequences of reforms and the intelligentsia’s present ineptness. The memory of
their deeds has sunk into oblivion and does not represent an example to follow for
the young generation who are either apolitical or servile to the state.
Some shestidesjatniki are nostalgic for the last era of opposition and political
activity during perestrojka. Thus, Jurij Burtin pondered before his death how ‘‘[o]ur
intelligentsia is now on the surface, now disappears’’ (Burtin 2000, p. 181). The
former 1960s dissident, who was one of the inspirational figures behind
Gorbachev’s reforms, published his A Confession of a Shestidesiatnik in Novyj
mir, a journal that is still somewhat nostalgic of the era of shestidesiatnichestvo.
While open to reminiscences about the intelligentsia’s glorious past, the once highly
politicized publication has become increasingly apolitical during Putin’s adminis-
tration. In a similar vein, the editors of Novaja junost’, a new journal that was
founded on the example of the notorious Junost’, a mouthpiece of shestidesjatniki
that first published Vasilij Aksjonov’s early novels, let their readers know that their
goal is ‘‘to stay away from the questions of ideology, politics, economics, law,
national, and religious relations.’’22 In the same issue, Valerja Novodvorskaja
published ‘‘Shestidesjatniki i pustota’’ (‘‘Shestidesjatniki and the Void’’), in which
she mocked ‘thick journals’ as ‘‘a sweet fruit of the bitter Russian roots, the roots of
22 Novaia Iunost’, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1999, p. 4.
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a lack of possessions, and, therefore, of idleness’’ (1999, p. 4). This was an epitaph
to the generation.
Shestidesjatniki contributed to their own oblivion, and to the renunciation of their
past which they enshrined as ‘‘melancholy, cries, and snot’’ (Novodvorskaja 1999,
p. 4). In a way, by supporting the neo-liberal reforms of the early 1990s, whose
economic ramifications eventually destroyed them, shestidesjatniki dug their own
grave. In a dismal analysis of his generation, 85-year-old Granin announced that
‘‘there is nothing left from my generation,’’ and with regard to the younger cohort of
intellectuals he wrote: ‘‘[t]here are epochs and periods of a particular cynicism in
life—when one lies not even in order to survive, but to amass a fortune, or out of
pure fashion. It was easier to reach one’s soul during the time of Gorbachev’’(2005).
With shestidesjatniki’s disappearance from the political scene, the intelligentsia was
indeed replaced by Western-type intellectuals.
It needs to be noted that while old age and a changed sociopolitical environment
have greatly diminished the role of the surviving former dissidents and
shestidesjatniki, many of them stayed true to liberal democratic ideals. Some of
the perestrojka activists continue to be engaged through their work in charity and
civic foundations, such as the Likhachev Foundation and the Gorbachev Founda-
tion, but also in human rights work. Their present deeds, however, do not represent a
viable and able political opposition, as before. Thus, Granin bemoaned the tragic
death of a consolidated democratic movement as ‘‘the people that I respect—
Chubajs, Khakamada, Javlinskij, Lukin—could not reach a consensus because of
their ambitions and thus ruined the possibility of participation in parliamentary
politics. This is unforgivable’’ (2005). The Congress of the Intelligentsia met for the
last time in 2003. According to the director of the Moscow Bureau for Human
Rights, Aleksandr Brod, the Congress’ main discussion revolved around the issue of
protest about the situation of ‘‘managed democracy, unprecedented centralization of
power, and its further separation from the rest of society’’ (2003). The organizers of
the congress pointed out that the intelligentsia is collaborating with the government
instead of being concerned with the construction of civil society. While in today’s
Russia there are plenty of initiatives such as the Congress that are critical of the state
of civil society, most end in pure rhetoric rather than in direct action.
New intellectuals are either disassociated from the concept of old-style
intelligentsia, and are politically apathetic, or aim to become the regime’s official
spin doctors. In their criticism of the West and keenness for the Russian president,
these intellectuals seem to forget that under Putin their country met its old ghosts
and the intelligentsia’s old nemesis: state control of information and ideational
space, as well as the suppression of dissent. However, while the contemporary
intelligentsia’s passivity is one of the reasons for the lack of a viable opposition,
another significant problem lies outside the group. The state does not permit even
the faintest attempts at alternative political action to enter into the official political
space. As Pavlovskij asserted to fellow members of the intelligentsia,
‘‘(…) while the opposition is not transparent, it needs to be filtered… the
acquisition of power by opposition that is politically non-transparent,
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intellectually incompetent, and financed by nobody knows who is impermis-
sible…It is unlikely that the state will change its strategy of control.’’23
Thus, a formerly active oppositionist now speaks of the lustratsija (the cleansing)
of the opposition (Pavlovskij 2005). Migranjan similarly notes that without a
‘‘responsible’’ opposition the ‘‘attack’’ on the current government from those who
disagree would lead to dire consequences. It has also become fashionable to warn of
the dangers of another non-violent revolution like those in Georgia and Ukraine
possibly happening in Russia. This, according to Migranjan, will lead to a complete
disintegration of the country (Migranjan 2005).
In his reply to Pavlovskij, the former human rights activist in the civic
organization Memorial, Aleksandr Daniel, rightly argued that there could be no
opposition if the state imposes heavy control over the transparent and open
information space where dialogue between the state and the people can take place. I
need not repeat a well-known fact that the media in Russia are state-controlled, and
apart from re-nationalized television few open outlets remain. The state leaves
virtually no room for the opposition to grow and to reach the public. It marginalizes
those members of the intelligentsia who disagree with official discourse. The
example of Anna Politkovskaja and other journalists who openly protested the war
in Chechnya and who seemingly perished as a result is a sad example of a more
general trend that is reminiscent of the repressions of the Soviet era.
Conclusion
The last 20 years in the history of the Russian intelligentsia have been a period of
great expectations and somber awakenings. During this time, the intelligentsia has
come full circle in both its words and deeds. On the level of ideas, the liberal
democracy discourse of the perestrojka years was supplanted by the disillusionment
of the El’tsin era, which, in its turn, gave way to an antithetical set of conservative
ideas. The generation of the fathers, once called ‘‘interior emigrants’’ (Likhachev
1996, p. 9) and ‘‘superfluous men’’ (Kagarlitsky 1988, p. 15), gave way to a
generation of sons, who, characterized as Western-style intellectuals, became spin
doctors and political technologists and replaced the original ideals and high moral
stance of their predecessors with nihilistic nonchalance. Action-wise, intelligenty
moved from the initial excitement over the crumbling of the Soviet regime and over
the beginning of the long-awaited period of liberalization, to the realization that the
road to democracy is tainted with difficulties and that it does not necessarily lead to
freedom but to anarchy and a new form of authoritarianism instead. Thus, the initial
joy turned into the uncertainty of the El’tsin years and eventually gave way to the
loss of political energy and a new system of coordinates within the newly controlled
ideational and political space of Putin’s Russia.
Much of the intelligentsia transformed from being the altruistic conscience of
Russia to becoming technicians of practical knowledge, polittekhnologi, who
23 Pavlovskii (2005).
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employ their newly discovered craft of political persuasion to serve the state and
advance its official ideology. The members of this new breed of intellectuals are no
longer producers of authentic meanings and bottom-up messaging but managers of
information delivered from above. For them, political ideas and ideals matter to the
extent that they can become pieces of the puzzle of the national idea. Within this
changed world of the intellectuals, politics is free of a moral dimension and serves
as a tool for the attainment of social (and material) advancement. Many
contemporary Russian intellectuals no longer hold freedom as their guiding
principle, as freedom has become an abstract slogan with no meaning. These
intellectuals are professionals who do not have the time, or the desire, to question
the increasingly authoritarian regime in post-perestrojka Russia. Nor do they
formulate and share any meaningful recipes for a better organized society.
The history of the Russian intelligentsia has come full circle in that its tragedy
has repeated itself. The causal interrelationship between the intelligentsia’s thoughts
and actions on the one hand (manifested in the link between the shift from support
of liberal democracy to the embracement of conservatism, and from political
activism to passivity), and between the negatively-perceived example of the
shestidesjatniki and the consent and apathy of the younger generations of
intellectuals, fits within a century and a half of history of the Russian intelligentsia
marked by highs and lows. As this paper illustrates, it is the perceived breach of the
intelligentsia’s tradition as the critic of the state that, together with other reasons,
accounts for the current condition of Russian intellectualism. The words of Leon
Trotsky therefore turned out to be prophetic: ‘‘[n]o matter how important was the
significance of the intelligentsia, in the future its role will be reduced to that of
servility and subjugation.’’24 If one is optimistic, this period of passivity will give
way to a new resurgence of dissent. This new wave of dissent might even make a
difference.
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